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ABSTRACT
This research examines the rationality of the expectations of nascent entrepreneurs. Consistent
with conjectures regarding entry into self-employment, I find substantial over-optimism in
nascent entrepreneurs’ expectations in that they overestimate the probability that their nascent
activity will result in an operating venture. Further, for those ventures that achieve operation,
individuals overestimate the expected future sales and employment. To explain cross-sectional
variations in over-optimism, I posit that those individuals who adopt an inside view to
forecasting, through the use of plans and financial projections, will exhibit greater ex-ante bias in
their expectations. Consistent with inside view adoption causing over-optimism in expectations, I
find that the preparation of projected financial statements results in more overly-optimistic
venture sale forecasts.
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INTRODUCTION
Expectations of future returns from vocational activity underlie the choice of employment
and trigger the decision to start a venture (Cassar, 2006; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000).
Individuals, when choosing to invest their time and capital in nascent entrepreneurial activity, do
so with an expectation of success, such as the probability of achieving an operating business.
Expectations also underlie the subsequent actions of individuals through the venturing process,
such as whether to continue in self-employment or how much additional time and capital to
invest (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997; McCarthy, Schoorman, & Cooper, 1993). Given
the importance of expectations on individual behavior, there are consequences for individuals,
their stakeholders, and the economy, to making inaccurate or systematically biased predictions
related to entrepreneurial choices.
The rationality of nascent entrepreneurial expectations, that predictions of future
outcomes related to venturing activity are made without bias, is often assumed when modeling
entry into self-employment and organizational creation (Evans & Jovanovic, 1989; Evans &
Leighton, 1989). However, researchers acknowledge that individuals are bounded and open to
potential influences that may lead them to have biased expectations (Kahneman & Lovallo,
1993; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Simon 1955). For example, there is substantial evidence that
individuals are overly optimistic, in that they overestimate the probability of favorable outcomes
(Weinstein, 1980). 1 The tendency of nascent and existing entrepreneurs to have over-optimistic
expectations may explain why individuals enter and persist in self-employment even in the
presence of lower returns from venturing (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Moskowitz & VissingJorgensen, 2002). While there are conjectures as to the nature of expectations of those entering

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=945206
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or continuing in self-employment, surprisingly, there is little evidence on the rationality of
entrepreneurial expectations. Simply put, there is no research that has investigated how ex-ante
expectations of individuals entering self-employment, namely nascent entrepreneurs, map into
actual ex-post realizations such as the creation of an operating business, achieved sales growth,
or returns from self-employment. Consequently, our understanding of the nature of
entrepreneurial expectations and entrepreneurial entry is incomplete.
I address this important gap by longitudinally examining the rationality of the
expectations of nascent entrepreneurs, namely those individuals who are currently involved in
the process of starting a business, using data from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics
(PSED). The distinctive feature of the PSED is that it identifies and surveys nascent
entrepreneurs while in the process of starting new ventures, thereby overcoming potential
survivorship and recall biases associated with surveying entrepreneurs already in business
(Gartner, Shaver, Carter, & Reynolds, 2004). Further, the PSED longitudinally surveys nascent
entrepreneurs throughout the startup process, allowing for the comparison of ex-ante
expectations with ex-post realizations, and thereby overcoming the use of perceptual measures of
predictions or outcomes.
To understand potential causes for nascent entrepreneurial over-optimism, I examine the
influence of information acquisition and use by the entrepreneur on cross-sectional differences in
over-optimism. Individuals undertaking nascent venture activity provide a powerful sample for
an investigation of over-optimism given the high uncertainty of the forecasting task and the
increased likelihood that entrepreneurs will exhibit greater cognitive bias than the general
population (Baron, 2004; Busenitz & Barney, 1997). While, generally, more information is
1

Consistent with observed over-optimism, some recent theoretical economic models have explicit
modeling of optimistic or overconfident individuals into self-employment (Bernardo and Welch 2001; Brocas and
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considered to be beneficial when formulating expectations (Durand, 2003; Forbes, 2005; Simon,
Houghton, & Aquino, 1999), several authors suggest that information acquisition and use may in
fact be ineffective in dampening, or may potentially exacerbate, the optimistic tendencies of
individuals (Armor & Taylor, 1997; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001).
In this paper, I argue that over-optimism in nascent entrepreneurs is exacerbated by the adoption
of an “inside view” to forecasting. Individuals form an inside view forecast by focusing on the
specifics of the case, the details of the plan that exists, and obstacles to its completion, and by
constructing scenarios of future progress (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993: 25-26). Researchers have
shown that individuals generally adopt an inside view to generate forecasts (Buehler, Griffin, &
Ross, 1994). The inside view is synonymous with the planning fallacy, which focuses the
attention of decision makers on the specifics of the problem rather than on the outcomes of
similar cases or “base rate” information (Baron, 1998; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Consequently, the planning fallacy, realized through the inside view, is argued to cause the
tendency for individuals to hold confident beliefs in the success of their own projects, even when
knowing other individuals have failed in similar projects.
I find significant over-optimism in the expectations of nascent entrepreneurs, in that they
overestimate the probability that their nascent activities will successfully lead to an operating
business. Further, of those nascent entrepreneurs who do achieve an operating venture, I observe
that they overestimate both the future sales and number of employees in the first year of
operation. These results are consistent with optimistic entry of individuals into self-employment.
Cross-sectionally, I find that formal business planning is associated with more optimistic beliefs
about future venture operation; however, these beliefs appear justified in that formal business

Carrillo 2004).
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planning also increases the likelihood of venture operation. Consistent with the inside view
causing over-optimism in expectations, I find that the preparation of projected financial
statements leads to overly-optimistic sales forecasts for the venture. Overall, this study
documents that nascent entrepreneurs exhibit substantial over-optimism in their expectations and
that over-optimism is influenced by the use of information.
The study findings contribute to theory and practice in several ways. First, it is the first
study to provide longitudinal evidence of the rationality of individuals’ expectations during the
venture evaluation process. As such, it contributes to the literature that seeks to understand the
forces that underlie entry and persistence of entrepreneurial behavior, and consequently,
organization creation. Second, this study contributes to understanding cross-sectional differences
in forecast over-optimism as the first study to investigate how the inside view can affect
expectations in a field setting. While the inside view has been conjectured to be associated with
over-optimism, there is limited extant theory testing of this within a field sample. The surveying
of individuals undertaking start-up activity overcomes concerns from experimental data, which
may overstate the role of decision making biases in the field (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Simon
& Houghton, 2003). Third, this study contributes to management practice by providing a link
between management practices and observed psychological bias. Understanding what influences
forecasting bias is vital for all decision makers, as expectations underlie future actions and
behavior. Documenting a relationship between commonly used management practices and
optimistic prediction is particularly important, given the fundamental role that financial
projections play in allowing decision makers to structure expectations and cope with the future,
and because academics and stakeholders generally encourage the use of formal planning and
financial projections. The evidence from this study suggests that the same management activities
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that are relied upon and encouraged to be adopted to cope with uncertainty are associated with
overly-optimistic expectations.

THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES
Over-Optimism
While rationality of entrepreneurial expectations is often assumed in economic models of
entry into venturing, researchers acknowledge that individuals are bounded and open to potential
influences that may lead to them to have biased expectations (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). There is substantial evidence in many domains that individuals are
optimistic (Weinstein, 1980). This evidence shows not only that individuals perceive that
favorable events are more likely to happen, but also that favorable events are more likely to
happen to them rather than their peers (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Similarly, individuals generally
exhibit overconfidence, in that they overestimate their ability to do well (Larwood & Whittaker,
1977). Such overconfidence can be in regard to an individual’s knowledge, ability to predict the
future, or general personal abilities (Hayward, Shepherd & Griffin 2006: 162; Kruger &
Dunning, 1999; Simon & Houghton, 2003).
The presence of optimism about exogenous events and excessive self-confidence results
in decision makers generally having overly optimistic expectations, in that their expectations of
the outcomes regarding their chosen actions exhibit a positive ex-ante bias (Gervais, Heaton &
Odean, 2005; Heaton, 2002; Malmendier & Tate, 2005a).2 In other words, decision makers’

2

Some authors refer to overconfidence to describe the overestimation of expected returns, such as personal
wealth, from their decisions (Hayward et al., 2006: 161; Malmendier & Tate, 2005b: 651). Kahneman & Tversky
(1995: 46) use the term optimistic overconfidence to describe an individual’s overestimation of success and their
certainty to ensure success. I adopt the term over-optimism from the forecasting literature, which describes the
properties of the forecast investigated that is argued to be an outcome of the decision making process (Cassar &
Gibson, 2007; Sedor, 2002).
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expectations of future outcomes are more favorable than what eventually occurs. Further, overoptimism tends to be exacerbated when tasks are perceived to be controllable and therefore is
likely to be heightened if expectations are based upon planned activity (Weinstein, 1980). In this
study’s setting, individuals are considered to be overly optimistic when they overestimate the
likelihood that their nascent activity will result in an operating venture or when they overestimate
the future sales and employment of their new ventures.
However, the presence of over-optimistic beliefs in those that enter nascent
entrepreneurship and self-employment does not require optimism, overconfidence, or any
presence of psychological bias. Entrepreneurs can hold over-optimistic beliefs simply as a
consequence of acting rationally on noisy yet unbiased signals of returns from vocational activity
(Van den Steen, 2004). Whereby, those individuals who act on favorable signals from venturing
are more likely to have observed signals with optimistic errors (Brown, 1974; Harrison & March,
1984). Therefore, simple self-selection, based on rational choices can result in over-optimism in
those who choose to undertake nascent activity and become entrepreneurs. Given its definition
and measurement, over-optimism is observed in this study regardless if it is a consequence of
cognitive bias or hubris, of simple self-selection, or of a combination of these effects.
While there is no evidence in the extant literature of the rationality of nascent
entrepreneurial expectations, Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg (1988) observed that existing
entrepreneurs reported the odds of their business “succeeding” to be significantly higher than
historically observed and substantially better than the odds of success for other similar
businesses. They concluded that the observed differences in expectations was likely caused by
ex-post decision bolstering, in that once the entry into self-employment had been made,
entrepreneurs were likely to justify this choice by believing it would lead to success. In this study
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setting, ex-post decision bolstering can not be a cause of optimism, as the expectations observed
are elicited before the venture is operational.
Hypothesis 1. Nascent entrepreneurial expectations are overly-optimistic.

Plans and Projections
I argue that over-optimistic forecasts of nascent entrepreneurs’ results from the inside
view whereby predictions are anchored on plans in which individuals have a vested interest.
Individuals generate an inside view forecast by focusing on the case at hand, considering the plan
and obstacles to its completion, and constructing scenarios of future progress (Kahneman &
Lovallo, 1993: 25). The inside view, which is synonymous with the planning fallacy, draws on
knowledge of the specifics of the case, details of the plan, and ideas about how likely obstacles
might be overcome. The inside view represents an individual’s attempt to come to grips with the
complexities of the unique characteristics and circumstances of the task or project. In contrast, an
outside view is statistical and comparative in nature and does not involve any attempt to divine
the future at any level of detail (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993: 25).
Consistent with an inside view approach, evidence from experimental research suggests
that people typically make forecasts by constructing a mental scenario of how the project is
likely to develop (Buehler et al., 1994). Scenarios can be described as representations of
temporally ordered sequences of events glued together by causal relationships (Griffin, Dunning,
& Ross, 1990; Johnson & Sherman, 1990). The process of scenario formulation allows the
decision maker to evaluate a given problem in a step-by-step manner by analyzing the outcome
of a series of causal events (Hastie & Dawes, 2001). Experimental research has also shown that
when individuals are provided with reasons or scenarios for why an outcome will be achieved,
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their expectation of that outcome occurring increases (Hoch, 1984; Levi & Pryor, 1987).
Buehler, Griffin, & MacDonald (1997) found that when participants were given incentives to
complete a task, they exhibited greater optimistic bias. Further analysis revealed that the
incentives focused participants more narrowly on their plans, consistent with the inside view.
Consequently, the inside view tends to exacerbate tendencies of optimism and overconfidence
that are observed in individuals’ decision making and formulation of expectations.
The use of plans and projections by entrepreneurs is associated with scenario
representation. For example, a formal business plan specifies the goals of the firm, and how the
firm will achieve these goals through strategic to operational detail. Similarly, financial
projections provide a monetary representation of the goals and expected performance of the firm.
Business plans and financial projections emphasize the interrelationship between and among
various activities and actions of the firm. For example, strategic goals lead to operational goals,
which lead to specific tasks to enable goal attainment. Financial projections are a function of
strategies and planned behavior. Further, the relevance of outside sources can be masked by
detailed acquaintance with the specific case or by intense involvement in it (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979). As more information is provided to the decision maker, such as through formal
documents detailing scenarios of goal achievement, the individual’s propensity to employ an
inside approach should increase, reducing the consideration given to outside sources of
information. Consequently, the development of business plans or financial projections should
encourage or be reflective of an inside approach to the formulation of expectations.
While entrepreneurs can make plans or set financial targets without formally developing
business plans or financial projections, it is undertaking these management activities that
encourage reflection on the implementation of one’s actions, thereby making people more
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confident in the success of the plan or the probability of achieving the targets specified (Armor &
Taylor, 1998; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). Social psychologists suggest that people become
more confident in their beliefs when they generate explanations for their choices and beliefs
(Heath & Gonzalez, 1995). Further, the inside view may exacerbate other biases in decisionmaking that can contribute to over-optimism. For example, when individuals focus on their own
capabilities and actions, they may neglect the abilities and potential actions of competitors
(Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003). Additionally, individuals may anchor on the positive goals
formulated in plans and financial projections, such as estimated revenue, and not place enough
weight to new information, such as recent sales (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Consequently,
the development or use of plans and scenarios by individuals with a vested interest in these
planned behaviors is more likely to exacerbate tendencies to formulate over-optimistic
expectations.
An important aspect of the arguments relating the inside view to forecasting bias is the
context and setting of the forecast. As with decision making generally, the presence of nonrational expectations is more likely in situations of high uncertainty or complexity (Kahneman,
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). The tendency to rely upon singular information while neglecting base
rate or distributional information is enhanced by the perceived uniqueness of the problem
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Consequently, the inside view arguments do not pertain to
decisions that are routinely repeated, with the critical question being whether a particular
problem or forecast is treated as unique, or as a problem similar to many others (Kahneman &
Lovallo, 1993: 25). Grossly optimistic forecasts may be especially likely if the forecasts relate to
a new technology or new type of project or otherwise places the forecaster in an unfamiliar or
dynamic setting (Hayward et al., 2006: 164). In contrast, opportunities for learning and for
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statistical aggregation exist when closely related problems are frequently encountered
(Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993: 18). All of this suggests that studying nascent entrepreneurs during
the startup stage provides a powerful setting to investigate the influence of the inside view on
forecasting biases.
Hypothesis 2. Nascent entrepreneurs who adopt plans and projections have
expectations that are more overly-optimistic.

METHOD
Sample
I used the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) to investigate the rationality
of entrepreneurs’ expectations. 3 The distinctive feature of the PSED is that it identifies and
surveys nascent entrepreneurs in the process of starting new ventures, thereby overcoming
potential survivorship and recall biases, such as hindsight bias, self-justification bias, and
attribution bias, associated with surveying entrepreneurs already in business (Conway & Ross,
1984; Golden, 1992; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). The PSED screened 64,622 individuals from the
U.S. mainland, aged 18 or older, who were randomly selected using random-digit-dial sampling
(Gartner et al., 2004). The screening phone interview asked if the respondent, alone or with
others, was currently trying to start a new business. The respondents who answered yes were
further asked if: 1) they expected to have at least some ownership in the new firm; and 2) they
actively tried to start the new firm in the past 12 months. Those 3,592 respondents who answered
yes to both the above questions were considered eligible for the nascent entrepreneur interview.

3

Research using data, questions, or research designs developed from the PSED has been published in
numerous mainstream management and entrepreneurship based journals including: Entrepreneurship Theory and
Practice, Journal of Business Venturing, Journal of Management, Journal of Small Business Management, Small
Business Economics, Strategic Management Journal, and Management Science.
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Of those 3,592 respondents, 3,158 (87 percent) volunteered to participate in future interviews. A
random sub-sample of 1,164 respondents was selected, contacted, and asked a further screening
question to ensure that their current activity was considered a nascent effort rather than an infant
business. Specifically, they were asked: “Has the start-up had a positive monthly cash flow that
covers expenses and the owner-manager salaries for more than three months?” All respondents
who reported that their nascent venturing activity achieved positive cash flows for more than
three months at the time of the phone survey were removed, resulting in 830 nascent
entrepreneurs who were subsequently phone interviewed in the first wave of the survey. 4
Nascent entrepreneurs chosen for this study were chosen as those attempting to start a
new business, but not on behalf of an employer. These two criteria ensure that the expectations
and characteristics observed relate specifically to the respondent rather than occur as a
consequence of undertaking entrepreneurial activities on another person’s behalf. 5 Further, I
exclude nascent activity related to the purchase or take-over of existing businesses and franchise
or multi-level marketing initiatives. Given the focus of the research on expectations before
business operation, I remove all respondents who reported that their nascent activity had
achieved positive monthly cash flow at the time of the first phone interview. These additional
criteria reduced the sample size to 592 respondents. All expectations used in this study were
solicited from this nascent entrepreneur sample during the remainder of the first phone interview.

4

The rationale for adopting this definition was to be consistent with other PSED research that has
investigated nascent venture activity. Under the PSED sampling, the achievement of positive monthly cash flows for
more than three months was considered an infant business and not a start-up effort (Gartner et al. 2004). To examine
the concern that including ventures that were generating revenues in the sample was spuriously affecting the
findings I removed all start-up activity that had any revenues at the time of the first survey. The findings for the
remaining sub-sample were the same as the full sample.
5

A single respondent approach was used as the research focus is on expectations of individuals undertaking
nascent activity. Given nascent activity that involves a startup team is comprised of individuals, each with an
expectation of success that underlies their decision to be involved and remain involved in the nascent activity, the
study findings are applicable to both individual and team based nascent activity. In 36 percent of the nascent
ventures studied, the entire startup team consisted of a single founder.
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Finally, I limit the sample to the 386 respondents who reported at least one expectation and
subsequently reported the associated ex-post realization.
An examination of potential sample bias between those who responded in future phone
interviews and those who did not, revealed no statistically significant differences with regard to
respondent gender, age, formal business planning, financial projections, expectations of venture
operation, or first-year venture sales and employees.
Variables
Bias. Three expectations of the nascent entrepreneur were empirically examined in this
study, namely: 1) likelihood of start-up becoming an operating business; 2) future sales in the
first full year of operation; and 3) number of future employees, excluding owners, at the end of
first full year of operation. To examine the expectation of the start-up becoming an operational
business, the respondents were asked: “On a scale of zero to one hundred, what is the likelihood
that this business will be operating five years from now, regardless of who owns and operates the
firm?” The likelihood obtained is referred to as the nascent entrepreneurs’ expectation of
operation. For expectations of future sales, nascent entrepreneurs were asked: “What would you
expect the total sales, revenues, or fees to be in the first full year of operation?” While
expectations related to fifth-year sales were also elicited, given the temporal period of the
longitudinal survey, information regarding actual sales related to the fifth-year operations was
not obtained by the PSED. For employment expectations, the entrepreneurs were asked: “By the
end of the first full year of operation, about how many full-time employees, not counting owners,
do you expect to be working for pay at this new business?” 6
6

In addition to this measure, a further employment expectation measure was calculated to incorporate
expectations of part-time employees. This alternative expectation measure is the sum of expected full time
employment plus half the expected part time employment. The results are invariant to the alternative expectation
measure and consequently are not reported.
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Entrepreneurs self-reported whether the start-up was an operating business in follow up
phone interviews. These interviews were conducted in three waves at a mean (median) 14 (13),
33 (32), and 56 (56) months following the initial screening interview. Respondents were asked to
classify the current status of the start-up effort as a(n): 1) operating business; 2) active start-up;
3) inactive start-up; and 4) no longer worked on by anyone. All those who reported the existence
of an operating business, and who did not abandon the operating business at a future date, were
coded as operating. All those who reported that the business was no longer worked on by anyone
were coded as not operational unless other team members had successfully started the venture.
Those respondents reporting active and inactive start-up activity more than five years from the
original phone interview were classified as not operational. All remaining start-ups that were not
operational or abandoned, and for which a phone interview was not undertaken at least 60
months after the original phone interview, were classified as missing. Table 1 provides a
descriptive summary of the 386 respondents’ status obtained from the follow-up phone
interviews. 7 The degree of over-optimism in venture operation was determined as the difference
between the nascent entrepreneur’s likelihood of venture operation and an indicator variable
(Status) that equals “1” if the venture is operational and “0” otherwise, as follows:
Operational Over-Optimism = Expectation of Operation – Status

(1)

-----------------------------Insert Table 1 about here
------------------------------Sales and employment information were also obtained in the three follow-up phone
interviews. Given that sales and employment expectations were framed on the assumption that
7

The findings are quantitatively similar if: 1) the 20 ventures started by other team members firms are
excluded from the sample; 2) the operating ventures classification included the 29 ventures that operated and
subsequently reported in future phone interviews that the business was shut down; and/or 3) a further 53 ventures
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the venture was operational, these analyses are only undertaken for those start-ups that became
operating businesses. For sales, entrepreneurs who were involved in a start-up that had
completed its first full year of operation were asked what sales or revenue was achieved in the
first full year of operation. I conducted validity checks on the timing of the ventures’ launch and
the timing of the responses and removed cases where the responses did not represent first-year
operations. 8 For numbers of employees, entrepreneurs who were involved in a start-up that
employed a non-owner employee were asked to provide the number of non-owner employees
hired in full-time and part-time capacities. The degree of over-optimism, for sales and
employment, was determined as a function of ex-ante expectations (F) and actual realizations
(A), as follows:
(Sales or Employment) Over-Optimism = F - A / (F + A)

(2)

The use of deflators reduces heterogeneity in the sales and employment over-optimism
measures obtained. 9 Importantly, all measures of bias in this study, through the utilization of exante expectations in comparison with ex-post realizations, overcome the use of perceptual
measures of expectations, such as “success,” using specific traits or characteristics to proxy for
optimism, or inferring optimism using observed optimistic biases in other domains (Cooper et
al., 1988; Lowe & Ziedonis, 2006; Puri & Robinson, 2005). Further, the confidential nature of
the PSED removes gaming concerns associated with forecasts that are observable to venture

that were active or inactive after 48 months but not phone interviewed afterwards were classified as not operational
instead of missing.
8

These validity checks included removing ventures that were not operational for more than one year and
removing responses in follow-up phone interviews that related to the second-year’s, rather than first-year’s,
operations.
9

Other approaches to reduce heterogeneity in the forecast error included using just the ex-ante expectation
or actual realization as the deflator and trimming, winsorizing, or log transforming the forecast error. The deflator
utilized was chosen as the skewness and kurtosis of this measure was substantially closer to zero, which is critical
for parametric-based testing. Notably, the study findings are invariant to alternative forecast error specifications
discussed above.
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stakeholders. For example, without confidentiality, entrepreneurs may upwardly bias observable
forecasts or actual realizations to present themselves or the venture in a more favorable light to
stakeholders or downwardly bias actual realizations to lower tax or regulatory costs.
Entrepreneur Behavior. The behaviors empirically examined in this study are: 1)
formal business planning; and 2) financial projections. A business plan was defined as something
that “usually outlines the markets to be served, the products or services to be provided, the
resources required – including money – and the expected growth and profit for the new
business.” Formal business planning was determined to be present when nascent entrepreneurs
responded that they had a business plan and that the current form of the plan was “formally
prepared.” Those responding in the affirmative were coded “1” and “0” otherwise. 10 The
undertaking of financial projections was represented by a dichotomous variable (“1” yes, “0”
otherwise) based on the question: “Have projected financial statements, such as income and cash
flow statements or break-even analysis, been developed?” 11
Controls. The characteristics of the entrepreneur may be associated with the overoptimism of their forecasts. For example, research has shown that males are generally more
optimistic and more likely to overestimate future performance than females (Henry, 1994; Puri &
Robsinon, 2005). Further, cognitive ability, knowledge, or experience of the forecasting task

10

Alternative definitions, such as defining business planning to represent all business plans regardless of
whether the plan was “informally written” or “formally prepared”, or adopting a hierarchical based planning
measure, were not utilized as the formal nature of planning is more likely to induce behavior consistent with the
inside view (Buehler et al., 1994; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). Further, the use of dichotomous predictor variables
or manipulations is consistent with experimental research in expectation formation and empirical research on
business planning (Hoch, 1984; Levi & Pryor, 1984, Sedor, 2002; Delmar & Shane, 2003; Shane & Delmar, 2004).
11

Another entrepreneurial behaviour that may be associated with over-optimism is the obtaining of market
information by the venture team. Specifically, the PSED asked “Has an effort been made to define the market
opportunities by talking with potential customers or getting information about the competition?” All the results were
replicated including this independent variable, which was coded as “1” for yes and “0” otherwise. In unreported
results, no support was found for an association between market information and over-optimism. However, very
limited variation in this market information variable in the sample may also have resulted in a failure to find an
association with over-optimism.
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should reduce the error or bias in predicting future outcomes (Forbes, 2005). I control for three
characteristics based on the demographics of the nascent entrepreneur, namely: 1) education; 2)
gender; and 3) industry experience. Education was operationalized by a variable denoting the
highest level of educational attainment of the respondent, being: 1) up to high school; 2)
technical/vocational; 3) some college including associates degrees; 4) bachelors degree; and 5)
post college. Gender was a dichotomous variable, coded as “1” for female and “0” for male.
Industry experience is the number of years the respondent has work in the industry of the nascent
venture.
Several venture organizing activities were utilized to control for the stage of development
of the nascent venture (Shane & Delmar, 2004). Venture organizing activities may be associated
with a nascent entrepreneur’s expectations, as the more activities undertaken, the greater the
knowledge of the venture and its viability. Further, as more activities are undertaken, the greater
influence of selection bias in the remaining set of nascent entrepreneurs, as those nascent
entrepreneurs that obtain confirming (disconfirming) information about the venture’s viability or
success will be more likely to continue (disband) the nascent activity. Product development was
determined from the response to: “at what stage of development is the product or service this
(start-up/new firm) will be selling: 0) still in the idea stage or no work has been done on a
product or service; 1) a model or procedure is being developed; 2) a prototype or procedure has
been tested with customers; or 3) completed and ready for sale or delivery?”. This product
development variable was deflated by three to provide a variable similar to the other independent
variables which were bounded between 0 and 1. 12 The extent to which the startup had begun
12

The decision to specify product development as an ordinal variable, rather than a series of categorical
variables, was to constrain a monotone relationship between the extent of venture organizing activities and the
dependent variables. In unreported results, the empirical findings were found to be quantitatively similar when
product development was specified as a series of categorical variables.
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marketing and promotion activities was obtained from the dichotomous response to: “Have
marketing or promotional efforts been started (for the product or service this (startup/new firm)
will be selling)?” A yes response was coded “1” and “0” otherwise. The extent to which the
startup had begun to obtain raw inputs was solicited from: “Have any raw materials, inventory,
supplies, or components for the new (start-up/business) been purchased?” A yes response was
coded “1” and “0” otherwise. The extent to which the startup had begun to obtain capital inputs
was solicited from: “Have any major items ($1000 or more) like equipment, facilities, or
property been purchased, leased, or rented for the new (start-up/business)?” Again, a yes
response was coded “1” and “0” otherwise. In addition, a variable representing whether the
startup had received revenue was solicited from: “Has the new business received any money,
income, or fees from the sale of goods or services?” Those that had received revenue were coded
“1”, otherwise “0”.

RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations of the study variables.
Examining the descriptive statistics reveals substantial over-optimism in nascent entrepreneurs.
First, significant over-optimism is observed in the nascent entrepreneurs’ expectations of venture
operation. At the mean (median), nascent entrepreneurs believe there is an 81.0 percent (90
percent) chance that their nascent activity will result in an operating venture; however, only 47.8
percent of ventures actually achieve operation, resulting in a mean bias in the expectations of
venture operation of 33.2 percent (t = 12.33, p < .0001). 13 14 Second, of those that achieved

13

While substantial optimistic bias was observed, the expectation of operation and the eventual status of
the venture was significantly positively correlated in the sample (ρ = 0.14, p < .01). Therefore, those individuals that

19

operation and had available first-year sales information, significant overestimation of projected
sales is observed, with 62 percent overestimating first-year sales as opposed to 34 percent
underestimating sales, resulting in a mean (median) sales over-optimism of 0.17 (0.25). Third,
employment expectations were also overly optimistic, with 46 percent overestimating
employment after one year of operations as opposed to 28 percent underestimating employment.
Overall, the evidence presented is consistent with nascent entrepreneurs being overly-optimistic,
and therefore supports hypothesis one.
-----------------------------Insert Table 2 about here
-------------------------------

Cross-Sectional Differences in Optimistic Bias
Table 3 reports a series of regressions reporting cross-sectional differences in
expectations of venture operation and operating optimism. Given the bounds on the dependent
variables, the assumptions that underlie the error distributions of ordinary least squares are not
appropriate: consequently, I use generalized method of moments (GMM). 15 For descriptive
purposes, the first three columns report the coefficients from models predicting the expectations
of operation by nascent entrepreneurs. These regressions are analogous to empirical research that
has examined entrepreneurial expectations without considering ex-post outcomes. Reporting
both the nascent entrepreneurs’ likelihood of success and the bias associated with their
expectations allows comparison between those behaviors or attributes that are associated with
predicted their nascent activity would become an operating venture were more likely to become operating ventures,
suggesting that respondents, while biased, were careful when providing operational expectations for their startups.
14

Significant over-optimistic expectations (p < 0.05) are observed for all major SIC divisions with greater
than 15 observations.
15

Regression techniques that incorporate censored dependent variables, such as tobit regression, are not
appropriate, as the assumptions of self-selection and censorship that underlie these models are not present for the
dependent variables investigated in this study (Maddala, 1993; Wooldridge, 2003: 553).
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positive expectations and those that are associated with overly-optimistic expectations. Requiring
non-missing values for all independent variables reduced the analysis to 368 observations. The
coefficient on formal business planning is 8.42 (p < .001), suggesting that undertaking this
activity significantly increases the nascent entrepreneur’s expectation of operation by 8.42
percent. However, whether formal planning is associated with optimism is determinant on how
planning is associated with subsequent venture operation.
Examining cross-sectional variations in operational over-optimism reveals that the
coefficient on formal business planning for observed over-optimism is consistently negative and
insignificant. Therefore, while formal business plan preparation increases the expectation that the
venturing activity will lead to an operating venture, such preparation is not associated with
overly optimistic expectations, as planning is also positively associated with the likelihood that
the nascent activity will become an operating venture. The coefficients on capital inputs and
money received is negative, suggesting that individuals whose nascent activities have purchased
significant capital inputs for the venture or who have received money have a lower bias in their
expectations of venture operation than those who do not. However, while this bias is lower,
individuals that have undertaken these activities still appear to exhibit optimism. Overall, the
evidence presented for operational over-optimism does not support hypothesis two.
-----------------------------Insert Table 3 about here
------------------------------Table 4 presents the GMM regression analysis for those ventures that achieved operation
for one year or more. Given the relatively small number of observations available for both sales
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and employment, formal business planning and financial projections are included in separate
models to avoid harmful multicollinearity (Kennedy, 2003). 16
Model 1 shows that formal business planning is not associated with sales optimism.
However, in model 2, it is observed that the preparation of projected financial statements leads to
more optimistic forecasts in regard to venture sales (p < .01). This result is consistent with the
inside view causing over-optimism in expectations. In particular, the undertaking of financial
projections encourages the nascent entrepreneur to adopt an inside view in regard to the financial
performance of the venture, resulting in overly-optimistic financial expectations. This result is
consistent with hypothesis two. Further, the above association is invariant to the inclusion of
venture organizing activities in the full model presented in column three. The results from model
3 also show that nascent entrepreneurs whose ventures have received money from the sales of
goods or services have significantly less over-optimism in their sales expectations. This
demonstrates the benefit of actually making sales in improving the rationality of financial sales
expectations. 17
Interestingly, for employment over-optimism, the relationship between optimism and
financial projections is no longer found, with the coefficients on models 5 and 6 actually being
negative and insignificant. An explanation for the difference between sales and employment is
16

The condition index is advocated to be the best indicator of multicollinearity and is calculated as the
square root of the ratio of the largest to the smallest characteristic root of X´X (Belsley 1991; Kennedy 2003). The
condition index on the full models presented in Table 4 with the inclusion of both formal business planning and
financial projections was above 25, which is suggestive of harmful collinearity (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980). An
explanation for the greater collinearity observed in these models, beyond the reduction in sample size, is the stronger
correlation between formal business planning and financial projections for the sub-sample of ventures that achieved
operation for one year or more.
17

To investigate the possibility that reported over-optimism in sales was driven by pressure placed on
entrepreneurs by investors to facilitate investment both the sales expectations and over-optimism of sales were
compared for those who had asked financial institutions and other people for funding and those who have not. There
were no significant differences between these two groups (t = 1.02, p = 0.31) and (t = 0.32, p = 0.75), suggesting
that this concern was not driving the presence of over-optimism. It should also be noted that given the survey is
confidential there should be no incentive on the entrepreneur to artificially inflate their reported expectation to
satisfy outside stakeholders.
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that financial projections are the monetary representation of the financial outcomes of intended
behavior. Therefore, the nexus between sales and financial outcomes is more direct than the
nexus between employment and financial outcomes. For example, additional employment may
be associated with increased scale, which may represent larger financial returns, but it may also
bring increased costs, which are associated with lower financial returns to the entrepreneur. In
comparison, sales are specifically modeled in financial projections, and greater sales are directly
associated with positive outcomes for the entrepreneur. Therefore, even though both sales and
employment expectations were highly positively correlated in the sample (ρ = .49, p < .001), the
undertaking of financial projections has different implications for the beliefs of nascent
entrepreneurs in regard to sales and employment.
-----------------------------Insert Table 4 about here
-------------------------------

DISCUSSION
Implications for Theory and Practice
The study findings are of interest for several reasons. First, it is the first study to provide
longitudinal evidence of the rationality of individuals’ expectations during the venture evaluation
process. The advantage of the longitudinal approach is that it elicits expectations of nascent
entrepreneurs and compares them to observed outcomes, thereby overcoming methodological
concerns of extant research evaluating the expectations of decision makers. Extant research has
demonstrated that individuals who are optimistic about their life expectancy or those that have
higher self-efficacy are more likely to be an entrepreneur than in career employment (Puri &
Robinson, 2005; Zhao, Seibert, & Hills, 2005). Similarly, extant research has found that
individuals who are overconfident in the certainty of their knowledge, in that they overestimate
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the correctness or precision of their beliefs in answering challenging questions or predicting the
future, are more likely to be entrepreneurs and more likely to undertake product introductions
that are pioneering or risky (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Forbes, 2005; Simon & Houghton, 2003).
However, these research approaches cannot answer whether individuals entering venturing are
overly-optimistic in regard to the venturing activities they undertake, as this can only be
achieved through comparing ex-ante expectations with ex-post outcomes. By providing specific
evidence demonstrating that individuals entering venturing overestimate the benefits from
undertaking nascent activity and subsequent entrepreneurship, this research contributes to the
literature that seeks understanding of the forces that underlie entry into and persistence of
entrepreneurial behavior.
Cooper et al. (1988) observed that individuals who recently became entrepreneurs
reported their odds of business success to be substantially higher than historically observed and
greater than the odds of success for other similar businesses. Given their research design, the
authors posited that these beliefs were caused by post-decisional bolstering. In the current study
setting, ex-post decision bolstering cannot be a cause of optimism, as the expectations observed
are elicited before the venture is operational. The evidence from this study cannot confirm or
reject that bias related to ex-post decision bolstering is present in entrepreneurs; however, it does
suggest that the presence of optimistic beliefs in entrepreneurs is not contingent on the presence
of ex-post decision bolstering.
Second, this study contributes to theory by being the first study to empirically investigate
how the inside view can affect expectations in a field setting. While there is evidence of the
presence of such views in forecasting behavior within a population generally, little research has
investigated cross-sectional differences of inside view adoption and forecasting biases within
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sample (Buehler et al., 1994). For example, while researchers conjecture that individuals are
generally too optimistic, it is unclear whether those who adopt a more inside view to forecasting
are more likely to have forecasting biases. Consequently, we have little understanding of crosssectional differences in forecasting rationality for individuals in similar settings. Further, there is
a lack of understanding about how the inside view influences expectations and beliefs in field
settings, with the limited evidence related to the inside view based on experimental settings. By
using a field design, I address concerns that experimental designs may overstate the presence of
bias in decision making, given their reliance on salient signals, lack of meaningful incentives, or
insufficient task orientation (Schwarz, 1994). This study demonstrates that differences in
management behaviors consistent with the inside view appear to be an economically significant
influence on expectation formation and contribute to understanding cross-sectional differences in
forecast optimism in the field.
Further, distinguishing between different types of expectations revealed that financial
projections, while being associated with overly-optimistic sales expectations, were not associated
with overly-optimistic employment expectations. Such a finding is analogous with the
compatibility principle, which has been observed in experimental settings, whereby the weight of
any input component is enhanced by its compatibility with the output. For example, when
subjects were asked to provide a numerical output, such as a dollar amount, numerical data had a
greater impact on their response than other data that was less compatible in content, scale, or
display (Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). As financial projections are the monetary
representation of the outcomes of intended behavior, they should be more likely to encourage
reflection on the causal events that lead to the financial outcomes. Further, employment
outcomes are more ambiguous in regard to the financial performance of a venture than are sales
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outcomes. For example, greater sales and growth may lead to greater need for the venture to
employ more people; however, more employees also represent greater costs, thereby reducing
the financial returns from the venture. In other words, the undertaking of financial projections is
associated with overly-optimistic expectations for financial outcomes, but not necessarily for
other outcomes. The varying implications for the expectations of decision makers from different
management behaviors highlights the importance of the context of the inside view and the types
of plans and projections used in shaping expectations.
Third, the study provides empirical evidence for cross-sectional differences in forecast
optimism distinguishing between ex-ante beliefs and ex-post outcomes. In particular, the
evidence suggests that formal business planning by the nascent entrepreneur, while being
associated with a greater likelihood that their nascent activity would lead to an operating venture,
is not associated with overly-optimistic beliefs. The explanation for this finding is that formal
business planning facilitates venture formation, increasing the likelihood of entrepreneurs
completing the tasks required to progress their nascent activity into an operating business. The
specific mechanism that planning facilitates organizational creation may be through focusing
goal attainment and allowing individuals to make faster decisions than with trail-and-error
learning (Delmar and Shane, 2003). Alternatively, regardless of the specific strategies and goals
set, the presence of a formal plan may stimulate structure to animate and orientate individuals act
with more intensity (Weick, 1995). This finding also demonstrates the importance of longitudinal
designs to distinguish between those behaviors or attributes that are associated with positive
expectations from those that are associated with unjustified or overly-optimistic expectations.
More generally, the study findings are of interest to decision makers. While research has
examined the forecast accuracy of decision makers, there is limited understanding of how

26

particular behaviors influence forecasting bias (Durand, 2003). For example, there is little
evidence on whether commonly used management practices moderate the level of optimistic or
extreme prediction. Consequently, this study provides an important link between observed
psychological bias and management practices, namely financial projections. This documented
relationship is particularly important, given the fundamental role that financial projections play
in allowing decision makers to structure expectations and cope with the future. The evidence
from this study suggests that the same management activities that entrepreneurs rely on to cope
with uncertainty appear to be causing individuals to hold optimistic expectations.
Acknowledging how management practices bias expectations may allow decision makers to use
organizational or decision-making controls to reduce this influence. For example, generating
reasons why the planned outcome may not be achieved or consciously relating past experiences
to the forecasting task at hand are approaches individuals can take to reduce overly-optimistic or
overconfident forecasts (Buehler et al., 1994; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980). In a
group setting, the use of conflict-based approaches, whereby members critique proposals and
make counter arguments may result in more realistic expectations (Schweiger, Sandberg, &
Ragan, 1986).
Another decision-making de-biasing technique is adoption of the outside view. Through
incorporating relevant information that decision-makers may otherwise neglect, the outside view
should avoid the over-optimistic tendencies from scenario thinking (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Specifically, with knowledge of the outcomes from similar
previous endeavors, decision-makers’ expectations can be formed through evaluation of how
their present endeavor compares to previous endeavors. Within this evaluation, decision-makers
should also de-bias their expectations by factoring out historically observed forecasting errors
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made by similar endeavors and control for over-optimistic tendencies when comparing their
endeavor’s future performance to previous similar endeavors (Flyvbjerg, 2004; Lovallo &
Kahneman, 2003). Therefore, this study also has implications for nascent entrepreneurs, as the
findings demonstrate a general forecasting bias in those entering venturing. An awareness of the
biased forecasting tendencies of those in similar decision-making settings may allow individuals
considering future entrepreneurial activity to incorporate knowledge of bias into future
expectations. However, the benefits of awareness may be tempered by the tendency for decision
makers to ignore such warnings depending on the perceived uniqueness of their venture
opportunity.
Limitations and Future Research
The study’s focus on individuals undertaking nascent venture activity is a powerful
setting in which the inside view tendencies are heightened, given the uniqueness of the
forecasting task and the vested interest of the forecaster. Future research should investigate the
extent to which inside view adoption, and the use of management practices associated with the
inside view, affects the expectations of decision makers in settings beyond nascent venturing
activity. For example, in an organizational setting, the use of groups and the extent to which
organizational controls are in place to reduce optimistic bias or provide forecasting discipline
may reduce or exacerbate decision makers’ optimistic bias on the expectations of decision
makers (McNamara & Bromiley, 1997). Variations in the nature of the forecasting task, such as
the degree to which a forecast is unique or recurrent, and the degree to which the forecaster has a
vested interest in the prediction or outcome may all influence both forecasting bias and the
influence of management behavior on forecasting bias. Such empirical investigations of the
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inside view may provide insight by testing the bounds of theory to which the inside view is
posited to influence expectations or exacerbate boldness in forecasting.
Many financial intermediaries require ventures to submit financial projections in order to
be eligible for financing. Such behavior is considered good business practice and not only
provides potential financiers with information concerning the investment project, but also signals
the competence and quality of the management team. The empirical findings show that the act of
preparing financial statements is associated with more optimistically biased sales projections.
Clearly, financial intermediaries and other stakeholders can undo any bias by the preparers
through due diligence or superior knowledge (Cable & Shane, 1997). To what extent outside
stakeholders are susceptible to potential biases in decision making is an interesting question for
future research. For example, how does financier confidence and optimism change as a result of
an entrepreneur’s submission of formal business plans or financial projections, or direct
discussions with entrepreneurs? Experimental evidence from other groups, such as venture
capitalists and financial analysts, suggests that they too are susceptible to simple manipulations
in the format of information, consistent with scenario thinking (Sedor, 2002; Zacharakis &
Shepherd, 2001).
While the findings presented here demonstrate that nascent entrepreneurs are overly
optimistic, it is important to recognize that the population investigated in this study is distinct
from those considered to be existing owners and managers of firms. Extant evidence regarding
the presence of over-optimistic beliefs in entrepreneurs and managers in established firms, which
has utilized a longitudinal design comparing ex-ante expectations with ex-post realizations, has
been limited and inconclusive (Ashworth, Johnson, & Conway, 1998; Cassar & Gibson, 2007).
Differences between nascent entrepreneurs and other decision makers may be a consequence of
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differences in ability, forecasting process, and variations in the nature of forecasting undertaken.
The extent to which entrepreneurs learn about their venture opportunity during the operation of
the firm through feedback and the learning achieved from venturing experience that may
improve their evaluations of expectations related to future nascent activity could be determined
with longer time-series data beyond the scope of the PSED. These important questions are left to
future research.
The empirical analyses in regard to over-optimism in one-year sales and employment
expectations were achieved with a relatively small sample, primarily because only those nascent
entrepreneurs that subsequently achieved an operating venture, were interviewed, and completed
the realizations after one year’s operation were available for comparison. The attrition resulting
from the low proportion of nascent ventures that become operating ventures and the longitudinal
nature of data collection can be addressed in future research by starting with a greater number of
respondents in the first stage of data collection. Importantly, even given the relatively small
sample, the association between financial projections and over-optimistic financial expectations
was observed.
Conclusion
This research examines the rationality of the expectations of nascent entrepreneurs during
new venture start-up. Consistent with conjectures regarding entrepreneur entry, this study finds
substantial over-optimism in expectations, in that nascent entrepreneurs overestimate the
probability of their nascent activity becoming an operating venture. Further, nascent
entrepreneurs overestimate future one-year sales and employment of the venture, suggesting that
they are overly-optimistic both in regard to the success of their venturing activity and the actual
performance of their operating ventures.
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Additionally, this study demonstrates important linkages between the psychological
biases present in nascent entrepreneurs’ forecasts and their use of typical management activities.
The adoption of plans and scenarios, in particular financial projections, significantly exacerbates
tendencies for individuals to make financial forecasts that are too optimistic. This suggests that
the same management activities that are advocated by academics and adopted by individuals to
cope with the future are associated with nascent entrepreneurs having irrational expectations.
Given the importance of organizational creation and venture growth, and the expectations that
underlie them, the findings from this study have important implications for both theory and
practice.
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TABLE 1
Future Status of Nascent Venture Activity
Future Status Description

Status

n

Not operating business after 60 months
Given up on start activity
Business was shut down before 60 months
Team members operating business that was given up by respondent
Operating business at last phone interview
Total

Not Operating
Not Operating
Not Operating
Operating
Operating

4
168
29
20
165
386
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics and Correlationsa
Variables
1. Operational over-optimism

n
385

Mean

s.d.

Median

33.17**

52.78

10.00**

1

2

2. Sales over-optimism

50

0.17*

0.53

0.25*

.20

3. Employment over-optimism

46

0.15†

0.57

0.00

-.22

.49*

3

4

4. Formal business planning

380

0.16

0.37

0.00

-.02

.03

5. Financial projections

385

0.33

0.47

0.00

-.03

.37** -.21

.38

6. Education

386

3.22

1.28

3.00

-.07

.04

-.15

.06

7. Gender

386

0.51

0.50

1.00

.05

-.12

.03

-.13*

8. Industry experience

386

9.18

10.34

5.00

-.05

-.01

.31*

5

6

7

8

9

10

.08
-.17**

.16**

.03

.05
.06

-.10†

376

0.63

0.38

0.67

-.13* -.17

-.08

.05

.05

.03

.01

.09†

10. Promotion

386

0.57

0.50

1.00

-.13* -.00

.03

.11*

.15

.06

-.05

.07

.40**

11. Raw inputs

386

0.73

0.45

1.00

-.11

.12

-.01

.07

.00

.34**

.36**

-.11

-.01

12. Capital inputs

386

0.53

0.50

1.00

-.15** .09

.20

.01

.12

-.05

-.08

.07

.23**

.23**

.35**

13. Money received

386

0.41

0.49

0.00

-.18** -.21

-.01

.07

.07

.03

.05

.08

.44**

.38**

.29**

† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01

12

-.13

9. Product development

-.05

11

.35**
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TABLE 3
Results of GMM Regression Analysis of Operational Expectations and Over-Optimism a
Expectation of Operation
Variables
Intercept
Formal business planning
Financial projections

Operational Over-Optimism

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

79.40*** (1.65)

82.42*** (5.05)

81.42*** (5.10)

34.13*** (3.50)

58.27*** (10.24)

58.11 ***(10.34)

9.90*** (2.85)
-0.44

(2.91)

Education

8.42**

(2.91)

-1.48

(7.40)

0.97

(7.40)

0.11

(3.11)

-4.60

(6.07)

0.22

(6.10)

-2.68*

(1.12)

-2.75*

(1.14)

-3.01

(2.19)

-3.03

(2.22)

Gender

1.66

(2.59)

2.45

(2.69)

6.22

(5.60)

6.34

(5.70)

Industry experience

0.25*

(0.11)

0.20†

(0.11)

-0.19

(0.26)

-0.19

(0.27)

Product development

2.63

(3.93)

2.69

(3.92)

-1.39

(8.67)

-1.37

(8.73)

Promotion

5.55

(3.03)

5.00

(3.03)

-3.69

(6.52)

-3.78

(6.57)

Raw inputs

-2.04

(3.14)

-1.78

(3.16)

-4.28

(7.20)

-4.27

(7.28)

Capital inputs

-0.37

(2.98)

-0.12

(2.99)

-10.27†

(6.16)

-10.25

(6.22)

1.93

(2.93)

1.48

(2.93)

-14.28*

(6.41)

-14.33*

(6.45)

Money received
Wald χ2

14.63**

18.17*

31.99***

R2

0.02

0.05

0.06

0.00

0.06

0.06

n

368

368

368

368

368

368

a

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
† p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001, two tailed tests
.

0.81

27.35***

27.37***
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TABLE 4
Results of GMM Regression Analysis of One-Year Sales and Employment Over-Optimism a
Sales Over-Optimism
Variables

Model 1

Intercept

0.16†

(0.08)

Formal business planning

0.04

(0.18)

Financial projections

Model 2
0.00
0.40**

Education

(0.09)
(0.14)

Employment Over-Optimism
Model 3
0.21
0.44*

(0.33)

Model 4
0.21

(0.12)

-0.15

(0.16)

(0.18)

Model 5

Model 6

0.26

(0.12)

0.00

(0.52)

-0.23

(0.16)

-0.20

(0.16)

-0.03

(0.07)

0.00

(0.08)

0.00

(0.16)

-0.03

(0.17)

Industry experience

-0.00

(0.01)

0.01

(0.01)

Product development

-0.14

(0.27)

-0.14

(0.40)

Promotion

0.12

(0.15)

0.07

(0.25)

Raw inputs

-0.01

(0.22)

-0.14

(0.32)

0.15

(0.24)

-0.30†

(0.16)

Gender

Capital inputs
Money received
Wald χ2

0.04

7.88**

R2

0.00
50

n
a

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
† p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001, two tailed tests.

0.41†
-0.10

23.79**

0.85

1.99

12.99

0.14

0.24

0.02

0.04

0.23

50

50

46

46

46

(0.23)
(0.18)

